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1HUMAN ERROR AND GENERAL AVIATION ACCIDENTS: 
A COMPREHENSIVE, FINE-GRAINED ANALYSIS USING HFACS
INTRODUCTION
It is generally accepted that like most accidents, those 
in aviation do not happen in isolation. Rather, they are 
the result of a chain of events often culminating with the 
unsafe acts of aircrew. Indeed, from Heinrich’s (Heinrich, 
Peterson, & Roos, 1931) axioms of industrial safety, to 
Bird’s (1974) “Domino theory” and Reason’s (1990) 
“Swiss cheese” model of human error, a sequential theory 
of accident causation has been consistently embraced by 
most in the fi eld of human error (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2001c). Particularly useful in this regard has been Reason’s 
(1990) description of active and latent failures within the 
context of his “Swiss cheese” model of human error.
In his model, Reason describes four levels of human 
failure, each one infl uencing the next. To hear Reason 
and others describe it, organizational infl uences often 
lead to instances of unsafe supervision which in turn lead 
to preconditions for unsafe acts and ultimately the unsafe 
acts of operators. It is at this latter level, the unsafe acts of 
operators, that most accident investigations are focused 
upon.
Unfortunately, while Reason’s seminal work forever 
changed the way aviation and other accident investiga-
tors view human error, it was largely theoretical and did 
not provide the level of detail necessary to apply it in 
the real world. It wasn’t until Shappell and Wiegmann 
(2000, 2001) developed a comprehensive human error 
framework — the Human Factors Analysis and Clas-
sifi cation System (HFACS) — that Reason’s ideas were 
folded into the applied setting. 
HFACS
The entire HFACS framework includes a total of 19 
causal categories within Reason’s (1990) four levels of 
human failure (Figure 1). While in many ways, all of 
the causal categories are equally important; particularly 
germane to any examination of GA accident data are the 
unsafe acts of aircrew. For that reason, we have elected 
to restrict this analysis to only those causal categories as-
sociated with the unsafe acts of GA aircrew. A complete 
description of all 19 HFACS causal categories is available 
elsewhere (i.e., Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003).
Unsafe Acts of Operators
In general, the unsafe acts of operators (in the case of 
aviation, the aircrew) can be loosely classifi ed as either 
errors or violations (Reason, 1990). Errors represent the 
mental or physical activities of individuals that fail to 
achieve their intended outcome. Not surprising, given 
the fact that human beings, by their very nature, make 
errors, these unsafe acts dominate most accident databases. 
Violations, on the other hand, are much less common and 
refer to the willful disregard for the rules and regulations 
that govern the safety of fl ight.
Errors
Within HFACS, the category of errors was expanded 
to include three basic error types (decision, skill-based, 
and perceptual errors).
Decision Errors. Decision-making and decision errors 
have been studied, debated, and reported extensively in 
the literature. In general, however, decision errors can be 
grouped into one of three categories: procedural errors, 
poor choices, and problem-solving errors. Procedural 
decision errors (Orasanu, 1993) or rule-based mistakes, 
as referred to by Rasmussen (1982), occur during highly 
structured tasks of the sorts, if X, then do Y. Aviation 
is highly structured, and consequently, much of pilot 
decision-making is procedural. That is, there are very 
explicit procedures to be performed at virtually all phases 
of fl ight. Unfortunately, these procedures are occasionally 
misapplied or inappropriate for the circumstances, often 
culminating in an accident.
However, even in aviation, not all situations have 
corresponding procedures to manage them. Therefore, 
many situations require that a choice be made among 
multiple response options. This is particularly true 
when insuffi cient experience, time, or other outside 
pressures may preclude a correct decision. Put simply, 
sometimes we chose well, and sometimes we do not. 
The resultant choice decision errors (Orasanu, 1993) or 
knowledge-based mistakes (Rasmussen, 1982) have been 


























































Figure 1. The HFACS framework 
Finally, there are instances when a problem is not well 
understood, and formal procedures and response op-
tions are not available. In effect, aircrew fi nd themselves 
where they have not been before and textbook answers 
are nowhere to be found. It is during these times that the 
invention of a novel solution is required. Unfortunately, 
individuals in these situations must resort to slow and ef-
fortful reasoning processes – a luxury rarely afforded in an 
aviation emergency – particularly in general aviation.
Skill-based Errors. Skill-based behavior within the 
context of aviation is best described as “stick-and-rudder” 
and other basic fl ight skills that occur without signifi cant 
conscious thought. As a result, these skill-based actions 
are particularly vulnerable to failures of attention and/or 
memory. In fact, attention failures have been linked to 
many skill-based errors such as the breakdown in visual 
scan patterns, inadvertent activation of controls, and the 
misordering of steps in procedures. Likewise, memory 
failures such as omitted items in a checklist, place los-
ing, or forgotten intentions have adversely impacted the 
unsuspecting aircrew.
Equally compelling, yet not always considered by 
investigators, is the manner or technique one uses when 
fl ying an aircraft. Regardless of one’s training, experience, 
and educational background, pilots vary greatly in the 
way in which they control their aircraft. Arguably, such 
techniques are as much an overt expression of one’s per-
sonality as they are a factor of innate ability and aptitude. 
More important, however, these techniques can interfere 
with the safety of fl ight or may exacerbate seemingly 
minor fl ying emergencies.
Perceptual Errors. While decision and skill-based errors 
have dominated most accident databases and have there-
fore been included in most error frameworks, perceptual 
errors have received comparatively less attention. No less 
important, perceptual errors occur when sensory input is 
degraded or “unusual,” as is often the case when fl ying at 
night, in the weather, or in other visually impoverished 
conditions. Faced with acting on inadequate information, 
aircrew run the risk of misjudging distances, altitude, 
and descent rates, as well as responding incorrectly to a 
variety of visual/vestibular illusions.
It is important to note, however, that it is not the il-
lusion or disorientation that is classifi ed as a perceptual 
error. Rather, it is the pilot’s erroneous response to the il-
lusion or disorientation that is captured here. For example, 
many pilots have experienced spatial disorientation when 
fl ying in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). 
In instances such as these, pilots are taught to rely on 
their primary instruments, rather than their senses when 
controlling the aircraft. Still, some pilots fail to monitor 
their instruments when fl ying in adverse weather or at 
3night, choosing instead to fl y using fallible cues from their 
senses. Tragically, many of these aircrew and others who 
have been fooled by visual/vestibular illusions have wound 
up on the wrong end of the accident investigation.
Violations
By defi nition, errors occur while aircrews are behav-
ing within the rules and regulations implemented by an 
organization. In contrast, violations represent the willful 
disregard for the rules and regulations that govern safe 
fl ight and, fortunately, occur much less frequently.
Routine Violations. While there are many ways to dis-
tinguish between types of violations, two distinct forms 
have been identifi ed, based on their etiology. The fi rst, 
routine violations, tend to be habitual by nature and 
are often tolerated by the governing authority (Reason, 
1990). Consider, for example, the individual who drives 
consistently 5-10 mph faster than allowed by law or 
someone who routinely fl ies in marginal weather when 
authorized for visual meteorological conditions (VMC) 
only. While both certainly violate governing regulations, 
many drivers or pilots do the same thing. Furthermore, 
people who drive 64 mph in a 55-mph zone almost al-
ways drive 64 in a 55-mph zone. That is, they routinely 
violate the speed limit.
Often referred to as “bending the rules,” these violations 
are often tolerated and, in effect, sanctioned by authority 
(i.e., you’re not likely to get a traffi c citation until you 
exceed the posted speed limit by more than 10 mph). 
If, however, local authorities started handing out traffi c 
citations for exceeding the speed limit on the highway 
by 9 mph or less, then it is less likely that individuals 
would violate the rules. By defi nition then, if a routine 
violation is identifi ed, investigators must look further up 
the causal chain to identify those individuals in authority 
who are not enforcing the rules.
Exceptional Violations. In contrast, exceptional viola-
tions appear as isolated departures from authority, not 
necessarily characteristic of an individual’s behavior or 
condoned by management (Reason, 1990). For example, 
an isolated instance of driving 105 mph in a 55 mph 
zone is considered an exceptional violation. Likewise, 
fl ying under a bridge or engaging in other particularly 
dangerous and prohibited maneuvers would constitute 
an exceptional violation. However, it is important to note 
that, while most exceptional violations are indefensible, 
they are not considered exceptional because of their 
extreme nature. Rather, they are considered exceptional 
because they are neither typical of the individual nor 
condoned by authority. Unfortunately, the unexpected 
nature of exceptional violations makes them particularly 
diffi cult to predict and problematic for organizations 
to manage.
PURPOSE
The HFACS framework was originally developed for 
the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps as an accident investiga-
tion and data analysis tool (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000; 
2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). Since its develop-
ment, other organizations such as the FAA have explored 
the use of HFACS as a complement to preexisting systems 
within civil aviation in an attempt to capitalize on gains 
realized by the military. These initial attempts, performed 
at both the University of Illinois and the Civil Aerospace 
Medical Institute (CAMI) have been highly successful and 
have shown that HFACS can be reliably and effectively 
used to analyze the underlying human causes of both 
commercial and general aviation accidents (Wiegmann 
& Shappell, 2003). Furthermore, these analyses have 
helped identify general trends in the types of human 
factors issues and aircrew errors that have contributed to 
civil aviation accidents (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2003; 
Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001a; 2001b).
Indeed, the FAA’s General Aviation & Commercial 
Division (AFS-800) within the Flight Standards Service 
and the Small Airplane Directorate (ACE-100) have ac-
knowledged the added value and insights gleaned from 
these HFACS analyses. Likewise, HFACS was cited by 
the Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) Joint Safety 
Analysis Team (JSAT) and the General Aviation Data 
Improvement Team (GADIT) as being particularly useful 
in identifying the human error component of aviation 
accidents.
To date, however, these initial analyses using HFACS 
have only been performed on a limited set of accident 
data within the context of civil aviation. Furthermore, 
these analyses have generally been performed at a global 
level, leaving several questions unanswered concerning 
the underlying nature and prevalence of different error 
types. As a result, AFS-800, ACE-100, the ADM JSAT, 
and the GADIT committees have directly requested 
that additional analyses be conducted to answer specifi c 
questions about the exact nature of the human errors 
identifi ed, particularly within the context of GA. Those 
specifi c questions include:
Question 1: Which unsafe acts are associated with the 
largest percentage of accidents across the entire decade of 
the 1990s (the 11 years from 1990 through 2000)? The 
answer to this question will provide insight into the 
types of human errors associated with GA accidents 
from a global perspective. 
Question 2: Has the percentage of accidents associated 
with each unsafe act changed over the years? This ques-
tion addresses whether any interventions implemented 
over the past 11 years have been successful in reducing 
4accidents caused by specifi c types of human error. It 
also provides information as to whether any particular 
error form has been increasing in occurrence and would 
therefore pose serious safety concerns in the future, if 
not addressed today.
Question 3: Does the pattern of unsafe acts differ across 
fatal and non-fatal accidents? Previous research in other 
aviation venues (e.g., military aviation) has shown that 
violations of the rules tend to be associated with a larger 
portion of fatal accidents (Shappell & Wiegmann, 
1995, 1997; Wiegmann & Shappell, 1995). Will this 
same pattern exist in GA accidents, or will other errors 
more readily distinguish fatal from non-fatal accidents? 
This question also directly addresses Objective 2 of 
the FAA Flight Plan that states, “Reduce the number 
of fatal accidents in general aviation.”
Question 4: Do the patterns of unsafe acts for fatal and 
non-fatal accidents differ across years? Similar to question 
two, this question addresses any increasing or decreasing 
trends in the specifi c types of errors across the years, 
particular as they relate to accident severity.
Question 5: How often is each error type the “primary” 
or seminal cause of an accident? Answers to the previous 
questions will highlight how often a particular error 
type is associated with GA accidents. What they do 
not answer is how often each type of error (e.g., skill-
based) is the “initiating” error or simply the “conse-
quence” of another error form (e.g., decision errors). 
To answer this question, we will examine the seminal 
unsafe act associated with each accident. Seminal events 
in this study were defi ned as the fi rst human error 
cited within the sequence of events in an accident. 
Ultimately, information regarding seminal errors will 
help safety managers within the FAA to refi ne and/or 
target intervention strategies so that they can have a 
greater impact on GA safety.
Question 6: Do seminal unsafe acts differ across years? 
Similar to questions 2 and 4, answers to this question 
will provide insight into potential trends that will af-
fect efforts aimed at reducing accidents and incidents 
among GA.
Question 7: Do seminal unsafe acts differ as a function 
of accident severity (fatal vs. non-fatal)? Like question 
3, an answer to this question could indicate which 
seminal errors are most important for preventing fatal 
aviation accidents.
Question 8: What are the exact types of errors committed 
within each error category? Just knowing that certain 
types of errors (e.g., skill-based errors) are of major 
concern typically does not provide enough detail to 
do anything about it. What we would like to know, 
for example, is exactly what are the skill-based errors 
we should focus our safety programs on? A more fi ne-
grained analysis of the specifi c types of errors within 
each unsafe act causal category will be conducted to 
answer this question.
Question 9: Do the types of errors committed within 
each error category differ across accident severity? Like 
questions 3 and 7, the answer to this question could 
indicate which specifi c type of error within each cat-
egory poses the greatest threat to safety.
Question 10: Do the types of errors committed within each 
error category differ between seminal vs. non-seminal unsafe 
acts? This question addresses whether there are differences 
in the specifi c types of errors within each category that 
are more likely to initiate the sequence of events. After 
all, a given causal factor may be the most frequently cited 
error form but may not be the most frequently cited 
initiating event. If the goal is to intervene before the 
accident chain of events is set in motion, this question 
will determine where to focus safety resources.
Ultimately, answers to these questions will provide 
us with an unprecedented glimpse into the face of hu-
man error within general aviation. The results of these 
analyses can then be used to map intervention strategies 
onto different error categories, enabling safety profes-
sionals to determine plausible prevention programs for 
reducing GA accidents. Essentially, this project represents 
the next step in the development of a larger civil avia-
tion safety program whose ultimate goal is to reduce the 
aviation accident rate through systematic, data-driven 




General aviation accident data from calendar years 
1990-2000 were obtained from databases maintained by 
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and 
the FAA’s National Aviation Safety Data Analysis Cen-
ter (NASDAC). For analysis purposes, we selected only 
accident reports that were classifi ed “fi nal” at the time 
this report was written. The NTSB reports two levels of 
investigation: factual and fi nal. The factual investigation 
is a preliminary report that only includes demographic 
information associated with the accident such as the 
location of the accident and severity of injuries but no 
causal factors. Only the fi nal report that contains the 
causal factors associated with the accident was of interest 
in this study.
We further eliminated from consideration those ac-
cidents that were classifi ed as having “undetermined 
causes,” and those that were attributed to sabotage, 
5suicide, or criminal activity (e.g., stolen aircraft). When 
the data were parsed in this manner, we were left with 
only those GA “accidents” for which causal factors had 
been “determined” and released by the NTSB.
The data were culled further to include only those ac-
cidents that involved powered GA aircraft (i.e., airplanes, 
helicopters, and gyrocopters), thereby excluding blimps, 
balloons, gliders, and ultra-light aircraft from the analysis. 
Although the latter is arguably a powered aircraft, ultra-
lights were considered suffi ciently different from other 
powered aircraft to warrant exclusion. Finally, since we 
were interested in aircrew error, we excluded accidents 
in which no aircrew-related unsafe act was considered 
causal or contributory to the accident. In the end, 14,436 
accidents involving over 25,000 aircrew causal factors 
were included and submitted to further analyses using 
the HFACS framework.
Causal Factor Classification Using HFACS
Seven GA pilots were recruited from the Oklahoma 
City area as subject matter experts (SMEs). All were certi-
fi ed fl ight instructors with a minimum of 1,000 fl ight 
hours in GA aircraft at the time they were recruited. 
Each pilot was provided roughly 16 hours of train-
ing on the HFACS framework, which included didactic 
lecture and practice (with feedback) applying the HFACS 
framework to accident reports. After training, the seven 
GA pilot-raters were randomly assigned accidents, so 
at least two separate pilot-raters analyzed each accident 
independently.
Using narrative and tabular data obtained from both 
the NTSB and the FAA NASDAC, the pilot-raters were 
instructed to classify each human causal factor identifi ed by 
the NTSB using the HFACS framework. Note, however, 
that only those causal and contributory factors identifi ed 
by the NTSB were classifi ed. That is, the pilot-raters were 
instructed not to introduce additional casual factors that 
were not identifi ed by the original investigation. To do 
so would be presumptuous and only infuse additional 
opinion, conjecture, and guesswork into the analysis.
After our pilot-raters made their initial classifi cations 
of the human causal factors (i.e., skill-based error, deci-
sion-error, etc.), the two independent ratings were com-
pared. Where disagreements existed, the corresponding 
pilot-raters were called into the laboratory to reconcile 
their differences, and the consensus classifi cation was 
included in the database for further analysis. Overall, 
pilot-raters agreed on the classifi cation of causal factors 
within the HFACS framework more than 85% of the 
time, an excellent level of agreement considering that 
this was, in effect, a decision-making task.
Human Factors Quality Assurance
The data used in this study were drawn from NTSB 
investigation reports that are often highly technical in 
nature, requiring a fundamental understanding of spe-
cifi c terms, fl ight conditions, and the overall domain of 
aviation to be effectively classifi ed and coded. As aviation 
SMEs, the pilot-coders were able to clearly understand 
each component of the investigation reports studied. 
What’s more, the pilot-coders represent the end users of 
improved error analysis methods for conducting accident 
investigations (i.e., aviation experts typically investigate 
aviation accidents). Therefore, they were considered the 
appropriate personnel for conducting the overall HFACS 
analysis of the GA accident reports.
General aviation pilots, however, are not SMEs in the 
domains of psychology or human factors, and therefore, 
they may not fully understand the theoretical underpin-
nings associated with the various error types within the 
HFACS framework. Hence, pilots might classify human 
error data somewhat differently than SMEs in human 
factors. Still, pilots in this study were trained on HFACS, 
which did give them some level of expertise when assessing 
human error. In fact, an earlier study addressed this issue 
by comparing the coded database of a commercial pilot 
rater to that of a psychologist and found the data to be 
reliable (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001a; 2001b).
Nonetheless, to be doubly sure that the pilot coders 
had grasped the psychological aspects underlying human 
error and HFACS, three additional SMEs with expertise 
in human factors/aviation psychology examined each 
HFACS classifi cation that the pilot SMEs had assigned 
to a given human cause factor. Essentially, the human 
factors SMEs were ensuring that the pilots understood 
the error analysis process and did not code causal factors 
like spatial disorientation as a decision error, or exhibit 
any other such blatant misunderstandings of the HFACS 
model. To aid in the process, descriptive statistics were 
used to identify outliers in the data, after which the cor-
responding NTSB report was obtained. The reports were 
then independently reviewed by a minimum of two hu-
man factors SMEs for agreement with the previous codes. 
After the human factors SMEs came to a consensus, the 
codes were either changed in the database or left as the 
pilot SMEs originally coded them. In the end, less than 
4% of all causal factors were modifi ed during the human 
factors quality assurance process.
6RESULTS
The results of this research project will be presented 
in a manner that addresses each of the specifi c questions 
raised earlier. Each section will begin by restating the 
question of interest, followed by a description of the 
fi ndings pertaining to it.
Question 1: Which unsafe acts are associated with the 
largest percentage of accidents?
The GA data were initially examined to determine the 
extent to which each HFACS causal category contributed 
to GA accidents overall. To accomplish this, the frequency 
and percentages of GA accidents associated with each 
HFACS causal category were calculated. However, to 
avoid over-representation by any single accident, each 
causal category was counted a maximum of one time 
per accident. For example, regardless of whether a given 
accident was associated with one or more skill-based er-
ror, the presence of a skill-based error for that accident 
was only counted once. In this way, the count acted as 
an indicator of the presence or absence of a particular 
HFACS causal category for a given accident.
The data were calculated in this manner with the 
knowledge that most aviation accidents are associated 
with multiple causal factors, including, on occasion, 
multiple instances of the same HFACS causal category. 
However, only by analyzing the data in this way could a 
true representation of the percentage of accidents associ-
ated with each causal category be obtained.
The number and percentage of accidents associated 
with at least one instance of a particular HFACS causal 
category can be found in Figure 2, with one notable 
exception – routine and exceptional violations. As with 
post-hoc data examined in other venues (e.g., the U.S. 
Navy/Marine Corps, U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, etc.) it 
proved too diffi cult to differentiate between routine and 
exceptional violations using narrative data obtained from 
the NTSB and NASDAC. As a result, the pilot-raters were 
instructed to use the parent causal category of “violations,” 
rather than distinguish between the two types.
The overall analysis of GA accidents revealed a picture 
of human error within GA that was not possible before 
the development of HFACS (Figure 2). Specifi cally, the 
data indicate that skill-based errors were associated with 
the largest portion of GA accidents (79.2% of the 14,436 
GA accidents), followed by decision errors (29.7%), 
violations (13.7%), and perceptual errors (5.7%). Note 
that many of the accidents were associated with multiple 
HFACS causal categories. In other words, an accident 
could have been associated with a skill-based error, deci-
sion error, perceptual error, and violation, or any other 
combination. Therefore, percentages of accidents do not 
total 100%. Additionally, each accident may be associated 
with multiple instances of the same type of unsafe act. 
However, as stated previously, the fi ndings presented here 
are for those accidents that involve at least one instance 
of a particular unsafe act category. 
Question 2: Has the percentage of accidents associated 
with each unsafe act changed over the years?
Analysis of the data on a year-by-year basis reveals that 
the proportion of accidents associated with at least one 
instance of each unsafe act category remained relatively 
unchanged over the 11-year period examined in this study 
(Figure 3). This would seem to suggest that safety efforts 
directed at GA over the last several years have had little 
effect on any specifi c type of human error. If anything, 
there may have been a general, across-the-board effect, 
although this seems unlikely, given the safety initiatives 
employed. The only exceptions seemed to be a small dip in 
the percentage of accidents associated with decision errors 
in 1994, a gradual decline in violations observed from 
1991 to 1994, and then again from 1995 to 2000. With 
decision errors, however, the trend quickly re-established 
itself at levels consistent with the overall average.
Question 3: Does the pattern of unsafe acts differ across 
fatal and non-fatal accidents?
Figure 4 presents the percentage of fatal (n = 3,256) 
and non-fatal (n = 11,180) accidents associated with each 
type of unsafe act. From the graph in Figure 4, some im-
portant observations can be made. For instance, it may 
surprise some that skill-based errors, not decision errors, 
were the number-one type of human error associated with 
fatal GA accidents. In fact, fatal accidents associated with 
skill-based errors (averaging roughly 80.6% across the 
years of the study) more than doubled the percentage 
of accidents seen with decision errors (29.5%) and the 
willful violation of the rules (30.5%). Even perceptual 
errors, the focus of a great deal of interest over the years, 
were associated with less than 4% of all fatal accidents. 
In fact, the proportion of accidents associated with skill-
based errors was greater than the three other error types 
combined.
Upon closer examination, it appears that the percentage 
of fatal and non-fatal accidents with skill-based, decision, 
and perceptual errors, was relatively equal (Figure 4). 
However, as expected, the proportion of accidents associ-
ated with violations was considerably higher for fatal than 
non-fatal accidents. In fact, using a common estimate of 
risk (known as the odds ratio), fatal accidents were more 
than four times more likely to be associated with viola-
tions than non-fatal accidents (odds ratio = 4.547; 95% 































































Figure 4. Percentage of fatal and non-fatal GA 
accidents associated with each unsafe act. 
8test for homogeneity = 1002.358, p<.001). Put simply, 
if a violation of the rules results in an accident, the pilot 
is more likely to die or kill someone else than to get up 
and walk away.
Question 4: Do the patterns of unsafe acts for fatal 
and non-fatal accidents differ across years?
As with the overall analysis, an examination of the 
3,256 fatal accidents on a year-by-year basis revealed that 
the proportion of accidents associated with at least one 
instance of each unsafe act category remained relatively 
stable over the 11-year period examined in the study 
(Figure 5). As before, there appears to have been a slight 
downward trend in both decision errors and violations 
during the early part of the 1990s. However, these trends 
reversed direction and generally increased during the later 
half of the decade.
While this is certainly important information, some 
may wonder how these fi ndings compare with the 11,180 
non-fatal accidents. As can be seen in Figure 6, the above 
results were strikingly similar to those associated with 
fatalities. Again, the trends across the years were relatively 
fl at, and as with fatal accidents, skill-based errors were 
associated with more non-fatal accidents than any other 
error type, followed by decision errors. The percentage 
of non-fatal accidents associated with violations and 
perceptual errors were relatively equal across the years. 
In fact, the only real difference in the pattern of human 
error seen with fatal and non-fatal GA accidents was 
with the percentage of accidents attributable, in part, to 
violations of the rules (Figure 7).
Question 5: How often is each error type the “primary” 
cause of an accident? 
The previous analyses have indicated that, overall, 
roughly 80% of GA accidents are associated with skill-
based errors. More important, however, is how often 
skill-based errors are the “initiating” error or simply the 
“consequence” of another type of error, such as decision 
errors. Consider, for instance, a pilot who knowingly 
takes off into a forecasted thunderstorm without an 
instrument rating. Such a choice would be considered 
a decision error within the HFACS framework. Later in 
the fl ight, the pilot may be faced with either turning 
around or fl ying through the weather (fl ying in instru-
ment meteorological conditions – IMC) when he/she 
is authorized for only visual fl ight rules (VFR) fl ight. 
If the pilot willfully penetrates IMC, a violation would 
be committed. This might lead to spatial disorientation 
(adverse physiological state), which, in turn, might lead 
to a misperception in the aircraft’s attitude (perceptual 
error), and ultimately the loss of control of the aircraft 
(skill-based error) resulting in an accident. Given such 
a scenario, some would argue that the fi rst error in the 
chain of events is more important than the skill-based 
error committed well down the error chain.
To resolve this potential issue, we examined the semi-
nal unsafe act associated with each accident, the results 
of which are presented in Figure 8. As can be seen from 
the fi gure, the pattern of unsafe acts was similar to that 
seen in the overall analysis above (see Figure 2). The only 
difference is that these percentages will add up to 100%, 
since there can only be one “seminal” human causal fac-
tor. Still, nearly 61% (n = 8,838) of all accidents began 
with a skill-based error. In contrast, roughly 19% (n = 
2,729) began with a decision error, 8% (n = 1,180) began 
with a violation, and only 4% (n = 564) began with a 
perceptual error. The remaining 8% (n = 1,125) were 
associated with a seminal event other than an unsafe act 
(e.g., a precondition for an unsafe act, such as an adverse 
physiological state).
Questions 6 and 7: Do seminal unsafe acts differ 
across years or as a function of accident severity (fatal 
vs. non-fatal).
Let’s begin with accident severity. As depicted in Fig-
ure 9, seminal skill-based errors were associated with the 
largest proportion of both fatal and non-fatal accidents. 
However, the percentage of non-fatal accidents associ-
ated with seminal skill-based errors was somewhat higher 
than for fatal accidents. In contrast, seminal violations 
continued to be associated with a much larger percentage 
of fatal accidents than non-fatal accidents. Percentages 
of fatal and non-fatal accidents associated with seminal 
decision errors were equivalent, as they were for perceptual 
errors. Worth noting, the latter (perceptual errors) were 
practically non-existent for both fatal and non-fatal ac-
cidents. This fi nding was not surprising given that most 
perceptual errors occur later in the chain of events; after 































Figure 8. Percentage of accidents in which each 

































Figure 9. Percentage of fatal and non-fatal accidents 
associated with each seminal error category.
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Figures 10 and 11 illustrate the percentage of fatal 
and non-fatal accidents associated with each seminal 
error across the 11-year period examined in this study. 
In general, the patterns of errors across the years were 
virtually the same as those observed for the overall error 
trends (see Figures 5 and 6). That is, skill-based errors 
were consistently the most frequent cause of both fatal 
and non-fatal accidents, followed by decision errors, 
violations, and perceptual errors.
What differences did occur between fatal and non-fatal 
seminal errors (i.e., skill-based and violations) remained 
relatively constant across the years of this study (Figure 
12). Furthermore, the differences were in opposite 
directions, with a higher percentage of fatal than non-
fatal accidents associated with violations and a higher 
percentage of non-fatal than fatal accidents associated 
with skill-based errors.
Questions 8, 9, and 10: What are the exact types of 
errors committed within each error category (question 
8) and do these types of errors committed within each 
error category differ across accident severity (question 
9) or seminal events (question 10)?
Just knowing that skill-based errors (or any other type 
of error) are a major concern does not provide safety 
professionals suffi cient detail to do anything about it. 
What is needed is a fi ne-grained analysis of the specifi c 
types of errors within each HFACS causal category so 
that targeted interventions can be developed. With this 
in mind, we compared each HFACS classifi cation with 
the NTSB’s causal factor designation. 
Contained within the NTSB database are three codes 
(subject, modifi er, and person code) associated with each 
cause/factor for a given accident. For instance, an accident 
cause may be stated as “VFR fl ight into IMC” (subject), 
“continued” (modifi er), “pilot in command” (person 
code). Another might be classifi ed as “directional control” 
(subject), “not maintained” (modifi er), “copilot/second 
pilot” (person code). 
Because all causal factors identifi ed in this analysis 
involved aircrew, we did not need to differentiate the 
person code. Of the two remaining codes, the subject 
code provided the most information. Although the modi-
fi er code provided additional clarity, including it at this 
time would have left us with a list of potential human 
causal factors well beyond the scope of this study (the 
list of subject-modifi er combinations far exceeds 500). 
Consequently, we restricted our initial analysis to only 
the subject codes.
Of note, many of the NTSB subject codes were similar, 
with only subtle semantic or behavioral differences among 
them (e.g., stall, stall/mush, stall/spin, and tailplane stall). 
Where similarities occurred among NTSB causal factors, 
the descriptions were grouped according to their similar 
nature. This reduced the number of unsafe act exemplars 
to a manageable number.
To aid in the presentation of the data, we will exam-
ine the fi ne-grained analysis for each type of unsafe act 
separately. Included in the results will be the “top 5” hu-
man causal factors overall, across accident severity and 
seminal events.
Skill-based errors. The most frequently occurring hu-
man error categories within skill-based errors are presented 
in Table 1. As can be seen, nearly 12% of all skill-based 
errors involved errors in maintaining direction control, 
followed by airspeed (10.63%), stall/spin (7.77%), aircraft 
control (7.62%), and errors associated with compensating 
for wind conditions (6.18%). Together, these fi ve cause 
factors accounted for nearly one-half of all the skill-based 
errors in the database. For clarifi cation, “directional 
control” typically refers to control of the aircraft on the 
ground, while “aircraft control” refers to control of the 
aircraft in-fl ight.
The types and frequencies of skill-based errors coded 
as fatal/non fatal and seminal events are also shown in 
Table 1. As can be seen from this table, the percentage of 
skill-based errors involving stall/spin, airspeed, and aircraft 
control was greater for fatal than non-fatal accidents. 
In fact, causal factors such as directional control and 
compensation for wind conditions were rarely associated 
with fatal accidents. This pattern was similar whether 
one compared fatal and non-fatal accidents, overall, or 
only within accidents in which a skill-based error was 
the seminal event.
Such fi ndings make sense when one considers that 
errors leading to a stall/spin, as well as airspeed and con-
trol of the aircraft in the air typically happen at altitude, 
making survival less likely. In contrast, errors controlling 
the aircraft on the ground (such as ground loops) and 
compensation for winds (typically seen during cross-wind 
landings), while dangerous, do not necessarily result in 
fatalities.
Decision Errors. Table 2 presents the most frequently 
occurring decision errors. Improper in-fl ight planning 
tops the list, contributing to roughly 18% of all decision 
errors. Errors categorized as in-fl ight planning refer to 
planning or plan revisions performed after the aircraft 
has taken off and are often studied as plan continuation 
errors (Orasanu, 1993; Burian, Orasanu, & Hitt, 2000; 
Wiegmann, Goh, & O’Hare, 2002; Muthard & Wickens, 
2003). The remaining decision errors, such as prefl ight 
planning/decision errors (8.94%), fuel management 
(8.73%), poor selection of terrain for takeoff/landing/taxi 
(7.85%), and go-around decision (6.03) all occurred at 
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Table 1. Five Most Frequent Skill-based Error Categories for Fatal and Non-fatal Accidents.
ERROR CATEGORY OVERALL SEMINAL
Frequency (%) 
   Fatal              Non-fatal            Total 
Frequency (%) 
   Fatal               Non-fatal            Total 
Directional Control  20 (0.50) 2018 (15.2) 2038 (11.8) 9 (0.57) 1326 (17.5) 1335 (14.6) 
Airspeed 713 (17.9) 1127  (8.5) 1840 (10.6) 302 (19.2) 605  (8.0) 907  (9.9) 
Stall/Spin 592 (14.9) 753  (5.7) 1345  (7.8) 84 (5.3) 144  (1.9) 228  (2.5) 
Aircraft Control  654 (16.5) 665  (5.0) 1319  (7.6) 311 (19.8) 429  (5.7) 740  (8.1) 
Compensation for winds 23  (0.6) 1046  (6.2) 1069  (6.2) 12 (0.8 859 (11.4) 871  (9.5) 
Table 2. Five Most Frequent Decision Error Categories for Fatal and Non-fatal Accidents.
ERROR CATEGORY OVERALL SEMINAL
Frequency (%) 
   Fatal               Non-fatal            Total 
Frequency (%) 
   Fatal                Non-fatal            Total 
In-flight Planning 268 (22.9) 683 (17.0) 951 (18.3) 133 (22.6) 427  (19.8) 560 (20.4) 
Planning/Decision-making on the Ground 115  (9.8) 349  (8.7) 464 (8.9) 89  (15.1) 284  (13.1) 373 (13.6) 
Fuel Management 40  (3.4) 413 (10.3) 453  (8.7) 20   (3.4) 252  (11.7) 272  (9.9) 
Unsuitable Terrain Selection 16  (1.4) 391  (9.8) 407  (7.8) 5   (.85) 284  (13.1) 289 (10.5) 
Go Around 22  (1.9) 291  (7.3) 313  (6.0) 5   (.85) 70   (3.2) 75 (2.7) 
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approximately the same frequencies. Combined, these 
fi ve causal categories accounted for roughly half (49.89%) 
of all decision errors in the database. It should be noted 
that individual factors related to weather-related decision 
making did not reach the top of the list (e.g., weather 
evaluation, fl ight into adverse weather, and inadvertent 
VFR fl ight into IMC). However, when combined, they 
did constitute a signifi cant portion of the factors related 
to decision- making (6%).
Table 2 also presents the types and frequencies of 
decision errors for fatal/non fatal and seminal events. 
As indicated, the categories in-fl ight planning and plan-
ning/decision making on the ground tended to be associated 
more often with fatal than non-fatal accidents. Whereas 
the categories unsuitable terrain, go around, and fuel 
management were associated more often with non-fatal 
accidents. This pattern was generally consistent for the 
overall data, as well as within seminal events.
Perceptual errors. A review of accident causes and fac-
tors coded as perceptual errors revealed that misjudging 
distance was the most common, accounting for over a 
quarter of all perceptual errors (26.4%; see Table 3). The 
next highest was fl are (22.5%), followed by misperceiv-
ing altitude (11.4%), misjudging clearance (7.0%) and 
visual/aural perception (5.1%). Together, these errors 
accounted for nearly three-quarters of all perceptual er-
rors in the database.
The types and frequencies of perceptual errors as they 
occurred within fatal/non-fatal accidents are also shown 
in Table 3. As can be seen from this table, there is very 
little difference in the percentage of fatal and non-fatal 
accidents associated with any particular type of perceptual 
error. The only exception appears to be perceptual errors 
related to performing the fl are, which, in most cases, was 
associated more with non-fatal than fatal accidents.
Violations. The top fi ve violations are presented in Table 
4. Analysis of the fundamental types of unsafe acts that 
are included within the violations categories reveals that 
the most common violation involved visual fl ight rules 
(VFR) fl ight into instrument meteorological conditions 
(IMC) (15.5%) and not following known procedures 
or directives (10.9%). The remaining top violations in-
cluded operating aircraft with known defi ciencies (9.9%), 
performing hazardous maneuvers such as low-altitude 
fl ight or buzzing (8.7%), and fl ight into adverse weather 
(8.5%). Together, these fi ve variables accounted for more 
than half of all violations in the database.
The types and frequencies of violations for fatal/non-
fatal and seminal events are also presented in Table 4. As 
indicated, the categories VFR fl ight into IMC, hazardous 
maneuver, and fl ight into known adverse weather were 
much more likely to be fatal than non-fatal, both overall 
and for seminal events only. This pattern is consistent 
with the observation that accidents involving violations 
of the rules are, in general, more likely to be fatal. 
DISCUSSION
The present study of GA accidents examined literally 
thousands of unsafe acts committed by pilots, perhaps 
suggesting that, correspondingly, there are literally thou-
sands of unique ways to crash an airplane. The results 
of this study, however, demonstrate that accidents that 
may appear to be unique can be reliably grouped, based 
upon underlying cognitive mechanisms of pilot errors. By 
applying HFACS, a theoretically based model of human 
Table 3. Five Most Frequent Perceptual Error Categories for Fatal and Non-fatal Accidents.
ERROR CATEGORY OVERALL SEMINAL
Frequency (%) 
  Fatal              Non-fatal            Total  
Frequency (%) 
    Fatal               Non-fatal            Total 
Distance 26 (17.8) 233 (27.7) 259 (26.4) 23 (33.8) 135 (26.5) 158 (27.4) 
Flare 5  (3.4) 217 (25.8) 222 (22.5) 4  (5.9) 163 (32.0) 167 (28.9) 
Altitude 22 (15.1) 91 (10.8) 113 (11.4) 9 (13.2) 51 (10.0) 60 (10.4) 
Clearance 18 (12.3) 51  (6.1) 69 (7.0) 14 (20.6) 41  (8.1) 55  (9.5) 
Visual/Aural Perception 15  (9.6) 36  (4.2) 50 (5.1) 3  (4.4) 5  (1.0) 8  (1.4) 
Table 4. Five Most Frequent Violations for Fatal and Non-fatal Accidents. 
ERROR CATEGORY OVERALL SEMINAL
Frequency (%) 
   Fatal               Non-fatal             Total 
Frequency (%) 
 Fatal                  Non-fatal            Total 
VFR Flight into IMC 305 (25.8) 53  (4.7) 358 (15.5) 182 (30.5) 29  (5.2) 211 (25.8) 
Procedures/Directives Not Followed 75  (6.3) 176 (15.6) 251 (10.9) 37  (6.2) 109 (19.6) 146 (12.7) 
Operating Aircraft with Known Deficiencies 61  (5.2) 168 (14.9) 229  (9.9) 27  (4.5) 97 (17.4) 124 (10.8) 
Hazardous Maneuver 154 (13.0) 47  (4.2) 201  (8.7) 83 (13.9) 24 (13.9) 107  (9.3) 
Flight into Known Adverse Weather 135 (11.4) 61  (5.4) 196  (8.5) 85 (14.3) 41  (7.4) 126 (10.9) 
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error, we were able to highlight several human error trends 
and identify the categories of unsafe acts that contribute 
to both fatal and non-fatal GA accidents.
While there are many ways to describe the accident 
data, perhaps the best way is to discuss the fi ndings in 
the order of their relative contributions to the accidents 
examined, beginning with skill-based errors.
Skill-Based Errors
By far, skill-based errors were the most common type 
of error in the accident database as nearly 80% of all GA 
accidents were associated with at least one skill-based 
error. Of these, roughly half were the fi rst human causal 
factor in the chain of events.
The most common skill-based errors among more 
than 17,000 identifi ed in this study included: control 
or handling of the aircraft on the ground and in the air, 
improperly maintaining airspeed, the occurrence of a 
stall or spin, and compensating for wind. Notably, these 
skill-based errors occurred more often than any other 
error category across all types of unsafe acts – not just 
the skill-based error category. 
These fi ndings are not without precedent in aviation. 
In fact, our previous work has shown that skill-based 
errors are the most prevalent form of aircrew error in 
commercial and military aviation accidents as well 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997; Wiegmann & Shappell, 
1999; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001a, 2001b). Still, the 
percentages reported here were generally higher than 
those found in our other investigations, suggesting that 
skill-based errors are even more prevalent in GA than in 
other domains.
So, what caused these skill-based errors in the fi rst 
place? Historically, these types of errors are often at-
tributed to failures of the pilot to monitor crucial fl ight 
parameters, a fundamental aspect of cockpit task man-
agement (Funk, 1991). For instance, if interrupted or 
distracted by a situation or event, a pilot can quickly 
become sidetracked from the primary task of fl ying the 
airplane. Furthermore, individuals are more susceptible to 
distraction during low processing tasks. Ultimately, these 
intrusions, uncertainties, and general distractions may 
keep the pilot from effectively monitoring the aircraft’s 
airspeed and altitude as well as other parameters critical 
to the fl ight. As a result, a skill-based error is committed 
that may lead to an incident/accident.
Another possibility is that the lower levels of experi-
ence and training obtained by GA pilots may account for 
the larger proportion of accidents involving skill-based 
errors than those observed in military and commercial 
aviation. Presumably, GA pilots fl y less frequently than 
their military or commercial counterparts do, such that 
recency of experience is less. Herein lies the rub. Accord-
ing to models by Reason (1990) and Rasmussen (1982), 
skill-based errors, by defi nition, occur during the execu-
tion of routine events. Furthermore, once a particular 
skill is developed, it must be maintained through repeti-
tion and experience. Given that many GA pilots fl y less 
and typically participate in less recurrent training than 
commercial and military pilots, it stands to reason that 
their profi ciency would be degraded. In turn, this lack of 
profi ciency may explain the increase in skill-based errors 
evident in the accident data.
Indeed, one can imagine a situation where increased 
workload in-fl ight (e.g., while fl ying in IMC or adverse 
weather) quickly overcomes an inexperienced pilot and 
diminishes the capacity to monitor altitude, fuel state, 
visual clearances, communication, or directional control. 
Furthermore, the inattention that results from a high 
workload situation could manifest as failing to monitor 
critical fl ight instruments, the failure to accomplish re-
quired in-fl ight checklist items, or the gradual, inadvertent 
loss of airspeed, all of which would appear in the present 
study as skill-based errors.
The real question is, “How do you go about reducing 
skill-based errors?” Perhaps the obvious answer is through 
experience and effective training. In that way, pilots are 
able to increase their familiarity with the rules governing 
fl ight and increase their knowledge of all aspects of their 
domain, improve their overall profi ciency, and become 
less prone to attention slips or memory lapses due to 
high workload or distractions. However, that may not 
be the only answer. Other proposed ways to manage 
pilot workload include detailed checklists (Degani & 
Wiener, 1993), automation such as auditory reminders 
of critical tasks (Norman, 1988), and task or workload 
management training (Wiener, Kanki, & Helmreich, 
1993). Whether these or any other interventions can be 
effectively integrated into the GA environment remains 
to be determined. 
Violations
Violations are the classic glass half-empty, glass 
half-full conundrum. On the one hand, GA accidents 
associated with at least one violation were present in 
“only” 14% of the data (i.e., glass half-full). On the 
other hand, GA accidents associated with violations 
were second only to skill-based errors when fatalities 
were involved (glass half-empty). The latter is of more 
concern to the FAA.
As stated previously, this fi nding indicates that if a 
pilot breaks a rule that results in an accident, he or she 
is much more likely to perish than if the accident was 
due to some other (non-rule breaking) action. These 
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results are similar to those observed in the military and 
commercial aviation domains (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2001a, 2001b).
Many of the violations cited in the database involved 
weather-related factors, including VFR fl ight into IMC. 
The question remains, however, as to why a pilot would 
willfully fl y into such dangerous weather conditions. Goh 
and Wiegmann (2002), along with O’Hare and Smith-
eram (1995) found that social pressures often contribute 
to continued fl ight into adverse weather. For example, 
Goh and Wiegmann reported that GA accidents result-
ing from VFR fl ight into IMC were more likely to have 
passengers on board than any other type of accident. 
Furthermore, in a study of weather-related decision-mak-
ing, Holbrook, Orasanu, and McCoy (2003) found that 
“systemic pressures” to fl y, such as those from passengers 
or other pilots, may “contribute to pilots’ decisions to 
continue fl ight despite cues suggesting they should do 
otherwise” (p. 581). Further analysis is needed, however, 
to determine the extent to which these factors contribute 
to accidents within the present database.
Beyond social pressures previously addressed, O’Hare 
and his colleagues (O’Hare & Owen, 1999; O’Hare & 
Smitheram, 1995) have explored this question by inves-
tigating how pilots frame the situation of continuing or 
discontinuing fl ight into adverse weather. They found 
that pilots who framed diverting from a fl ight plan as a 
loss (e.g., loss of time, economic loss, or expense of effort) 
tend to continue fl ight into adverse weather; whereas 
those who frame a diverting decision as a gain (e.g., in 
personal safety) tend to divert more.
Some research (i.e., O’Hare, 1990; Goh & Wiegmann, 
2002) suggests that pilot overconfi dence and a limited 
appreciation of the risks involved with fl ight into adverse 
weather may also contribute to weather-related violations. 
Others contend that there are GA pilots who “simply 
do not mind taking risks and yet who also either lack 
the experience to assess those risks, or perhaps have just 
enough experience to overestimate their own abilities” 
(Knecht, Harris, & Shappell, 2003; p.673).
While the percentage of accidents involving violations 
shows no appreciable decline over the years studied, the 
simplest way to reduce the occurrence of violations is 
through continually and consistently enforcing the rules. 
Unfortunately, simply enforcing rules more effectively is 
extremely diffi cult within GA due to its organizational 
structure. Since it is often not clear exactly whose  authority 
GA pilots fl y under (as compared with military and 
commercial pilots), it becomes very diffi cult to police 
the GA system.
As a result, other interventions have been proposed to 
reduce the occurrence of violations, such as the education 
of GA pilots on the extent of the real risks of violating es-
tablished rules and regulations. Another proposal involves 
simulator training of diffi cult tasks such as emergencies 
or risky situations to directly demonstrate the hazards 
associated with violating rules (Knecht et al., 2003).
While many cases of fl ight into adverse weather are 
rightfully coded as violations, there are many that may 
not represent a willful departure from established pro-
cedures and are instead the result of the misdiagnosis of 
weather conditions, improper planning, or a decision not 
to use prefl ight briefi ng service information. Rather than 
coding them as willful violations, these errors represent 
a breakdown in the decision-making process and are 
thus captured within the next category to be addressed 
— decision errors.
Decision Errors
Decision errors were present in roughly one-third of 
all accidents, which is also consistent with proportions 
observed within other aviation domains (O’Hare, Wig-
gins, Batt, & Morrison, 1994; Murray, 1997; Shappell 
& Wiegmann, 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001a, 
2001b). These percentages were roughly equivalent for 
both fatal and non-fatal accidents, even when only seminal 
decision errors were examined. 
Upon closer examination, it appears that many of the 
decision errors involved planning, both in-fl ight and on 
the ground, as well as issues related to weather evalua-
tion. Recently, Burian, Orasanu, and Hitt (2000) found 
that 28% of accidents involving weather events involved 
plan continuation errors, and suggest that pilots with less 
experience may “not trust what their eyes are telling them 
and so proceed on blindly” (p. 25). Wiegmann, Goh, 
and O’Hare (2002) also studied the occurrence of plan 
continuation errors of VFR fl ight into IMC and presented 
fi ndings that suggest that under certain conditions these 
errors are more often attributable to poor situation as-
sessment (early stages of information processing) than to 
motivational judgment. In either case, however, proper 
planning, both in the air and on the ground, is a critical 
component of fl ight safety.
Proposals for ways of improving pilots’ judgment 
often involve training in aeronautical decision-making. 
It is generally believed that novices may lack a full un-
derstanding of the signifi cance of some weather-related 
cues. Therefore, by examining techniques used by  expert 
pilots to assess situations and solve problems, a better 
training method may be developed. For example,  Wiggins 
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and O’Hare (2003) recently developed a program for 
the FAA that uses static weather images and short video 
clips to help teach pilots how to more effectively identify 
critical weather cues. Based on initial evaluations, the 
computer-based training program shows positive effects 
on aeronautical decision-making.
Another method of assisting pilot decision-making 
is the implementation of planning aids. Layton, Smith, 
and McCoy (1994) evaluated the effectiveness of three 
different planning aid (cooperative) systems and dem-
onstrated that different system design concepts can 
strongly infl uence the cognitive processes and resultant 
performance. Through their fi ndings, the researchers 
recommended further research into better information 
displays, geographical interfaces of alternative route ma-
nipulation, access to more complete and accurate weather 
and traffi c information, and optimization technologies 
to assist users in generating alternative plans. Others 
have encouraged further study of the improved design 
of displays that present critical data such as weather, 
traffi c, and other environmental information (Wickens 
& Hollands, 2000).
Finally, scenario-based training has been shown to be 
an effective technique for improving decision-making 
in a variety of domains. The training method involves 
embedding decision-making tasks within a “real world” 
context, similar to those in an operational setting. This 
is in contrast to traditional training methods that com-
partmentalize or modularize training, teaching decision 
strategies in isolation or independently from a particular 
context. Indeed, the FAA’s General Aviation & Com-
mercial Division (AFS-800) has recently introduced the 
FAA/Industry Training Standards (FITS) program aimed 
at improving GA fl ight training using scenario-based 
training and other technologies. While the program is 
currently focusing on “personal or professionally fl own 
single-pilot aircraft for transportation with new technolo-
gies” (Glista, 2003), there is no reason to believe that 
FITS will not benefi t the light-sport and recreational 
pilots as well.
Perceptual Errors
Not surprisingly, perceptual errors contribute to 
the smallest percentage of accidents within the present 
analysis (5.7%), a percentage that is much lower than 
that found in military research (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2003). Given the non-tactical, non-aerobatic nature of 
GA fl ight, spatial disorientation and diffi culties in per-
ception are expected to occur at a lower frequency than 
is found within military aviation, particularly within the 
dynamic domains of fi ghter, tactical, aerobatic, or night 
operating aircraft.
Furthermore, due to the relatively small numbers of 
perceptual errors coded within the GA accidents studied, 
it is diffi cult to draw any conclusions. Nevertheless, it is 
reasonably clear that errors involving misjudging infor-
mation comprise the majority of perceptual errors and 
represent misperception, as opposed to non-detection. 
Analogous to other errors made in the presence of cor-
rect and adequate information, misperception errors are 
disheartening, as pilots inaccurately code or improperly 
process accurate cues from the environment. Ultimately, 
this leads to the misjudging of altitude, distance, or 
descent, which encompass a large proportion of the 
perceptual errors cited within the present database.
That being said, one may wonder why spatial disori-
entation did not make the top 5 of the perceptual error 
list. Spatial disorientation, although often leading to 
perceptual errors (e.g., misjudging altitude/attitude), 
is not considered an error. Rather, it is considered a 
physiological state that cannot be controlled by the 
individual. That is, you are either disoriented or you are 
not and more important, not every instance of spatial 
disorientation leads to a perceptual error (e.g., Type 1 
– recognized spatial disorientation, otherwise referred 
to as the “leans”). 
Consequently, our SMEs classifi ed instances of spatial 
disorientation within the HFACS category of adverse physi-
ological states. Unfortunately, when NTSB investigators 
did identify spatial disorientation (an adverse physiological 
state using HFACS) they often did not identify the resul-
tant perceptual error when reporting the causes/factors 
associated with an accident. Hence, perceptual errors 
were under-reported here. For completeness, there were 
279 accidents out of the 14,436 we examined (1.9%) 
associated with spatial disorientation, of which all but 
34 involved fatalities.
Perceptual errors, whether caused by spatial disorien-
tation or other factors, are much like skill-based errors 
and can degrade due to lack of recency, experience, or 
training. However, in addition to training and practice, 
other interventions such as enhanced displays may improve 
the veridical nature of pilots’ perceptions. For example, 
such technologies as radar altimeters, angle-of-attack 
indicators, or other such displays may ultimately reduce 
accidents due to perceptual errors.
Additional Issues
As previously described, the present study examined 
only those causes or contributing factors that were clas-
sifi ed as unsafe acts by the aircrew. There are a number 
of other accident cause factors that involve humans that 
are not unsafe acts. For instance, in addition to spatial 
disorientation, a breakdown in communication is another 
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example of a human error that is not considered an unsafe 
act within HFACS. Rather, the category of crew resource 
management (CRM) captures errors of communication 
between pilots and their crew, other pilots, and air traf-
fi c controllers, and is classifi ed under the “preconditions 
for unsafe acts” within HFACS (Shappell & Wiegmann, 
2000, 2001; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
Many other potentially important human factors re-
lated accident causes are also captured within other levels 
of analysis such as fatigue, alcohol use, self medication 
(use of over-the-counter medications), workload, medical 
history, and work environment. While important human 
factors, these are also not considered to be unsafe acts and 
were not examined within the present study.
Nevertheless, such causal factors were rarely cited in 
the NTSB database. In fact, analysis of all seminal events 
indicated that less than 8% of all seminal cause factors 
were anything other than an unsafe act by the aircrew. 
So, although we can all agree that such factors as spatial 
disorientation, self-medication, and poor CRM are 
important issues (and HFACS does account for these as 
preconditions), they were virtually non-existent in the 
general aviation database.
Such limited information concerning pre-conditions 
for unsafe acts does result in only a partial picture of the 
entire sequence of events that contributed to the accident. 
However, the present study represents the most compre-
hensive human error analysis of GA data ever conducted 
and provides useful information for understanding the 
immediate causes of accidents. Furthermore, the absence 
of critical preconditions in the database clearly indicates 
a need to improve the accident investigation process so 
that more in-depth information concerning the causes of 
aircrew error can be identifi ed. Indeed, HFACS provides 
an effective tool for improving this process (Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2003).
CONCLUSIONS
The high level of safety currently achieved within 
aviation should not obscure the fact that many aviation 
accidents are preventable. It is important to realize that 
safety measures and defenses currently in place in GA 
may be inadequate, circumvented, or perhaps ignored, 
and that the intervention strategies aimed at reducing the 
occurrence or consequences of human error may not be 
as effective as possible.
Even though the results of the present study point 
to several ways to reduce the rate of GA fatalities, there 
may be several more and far better solutions that have 
yet to be identifi ed. 
Historically, accident and incident interventions have 
been generated by the NTSB in the form of recommen-
dations or have come from experts in the government 
(FAA, NASA, etc.), military, or other aviation organiza-
tions. As a result, they tend to focus on the prevention of 
specifi c types of accidents such as those related to loss of 
control in fl ight or controlled fl ight into terrain, rather 
than specifi c types of human error per se. What’s more, 
the interventions tend to be rather narrow in scope, of-
ten emphasizing only changes to the aircraft in the form 
of automation and displays or simply recommending 
changes to existing policies or regulations. Even when 
attempts are made to address specifi c types of human 
error, the emphasis has traditionally been placed on pilot 
decision-making, which accounts for just over 30% of 
the GA accidents that occur annually.
What is needed is a systematic approach to generating 
intervention/prevention strategies that can tie into the 
HFACS framework that has proven success with civilian 
aviation accident and incident data. Within epidemiology, 
one such approach, the Haddon matrix, was developed 
to address injuries sustained as the result of automobile 
accidents (Haddon, 1980). Haddon’s argument was that 
we often overlook potentially useful interventions by not 
considering all aspects of the accident/incident. In fact, 
when one examines the typical interventions recom-
mended by the NTSB and others following an accident, 
they typically focus on only a few areas rather than the 
gamut of intervention possibilities.
Along these lines, Wiegmann and Rantanen (2002) 
examined over 75 intervention strategies identifi ed by 
NASA for use within U.S. civilian aviation using a similar 
matrix. In that study, the vast majority of the interven-
tions were technologically oriented, leaving one to believe 
that a variety of other potentially useful strategies had 
been left on the drawing board or not even considered. 
Ideally, a similar matrix using HFACS causal categories 
could be developed that would be both manageable and 
effective at generating putative intervention strategies and 
assessing their impact prior to deployment.
It is apparent from the current study that human error 
associated with GA accidents is multi-faceted. Specifi cally, 
our analyses have revealed that the largest percentage of 
accidents is associated with skill-based errors, followed 
by decision errors, violations of the rules and regulations, 
and perceptual errors. While individual interventions 
may address one error form more than another, a true 
intervention “strategy” will identify a variety of interven-
tions targeted at all four error forms. The next step in 
this research effort will be the development of the Hu-
man Factors Intervention Matrix (HFIX) that pits the 
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unsafe acts of operators (i.e., skill-based errors, decision 
errors, perceptual errors, and violations) against several 
putative intervention approaches (e.g., organizational, 
human-centered, technology, task, and environment; 
Figure 13). In addition, other features will be integrated 
into the model/matrix such as feasibility, effi cacy, and 
acceptance. 
Once developed, HFIX will be validated and assessed 
using intervention programs currently in use and planned 
within the Small Airplane Directorate (ACE-100), the 
General Aviation & Commercial Division (AFS-800), 
Alaska Region (AAL), and other FAA offi ces.
Ultimately, the systematic application of HFACS, 
coupled with the methodical utilization of HFIX (once 
fully developed) to generate intervention solutions, should 
ensure that the aviation industry’s personnel and monetary 
resources are utilized wisely. This should occur because 
such efforts will be needs-based and data-driven. Together, 
these tools will allow the true effectiveness of intervention 
programs to be objectively and impartially evaluated so 
that they can be either modifi ed or reinforced to improve 
system performance. Only then can any great strides in 
improving the GA accident rate be achieved.
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